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 1 
Comment 
THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION & GAY MARRIAGE 
ADAM FARRA 
INTRODUCTION 
America is embroiled in a culture war about gay marriage.  This 
culture war has bled into both the federal legal system and various state 
legal systems.1  The result is a national patchwork of gay marriage 
jurisprudence.  A variety of courts addressing the same question have 
arrived at vastly different decisions and rationales, even though the law they 
applied is not particularly different.2  The question each court has addressed 
is whether restricting the institution of civil marriage to heterosexual or 
―opposite-sex‖ couples violates some equal protection guarantee or equality 
principle.3  The answers are anything but consistent.4 
This Comment explores the inconsistency and then attempts to explain 
it.  If multiple states are addressing the same question and applying, 
generally, the same body of law, then why do the results vary so much from 
state to state?5  Theoretically, if restricting marriage to heterosexual couples 
violates some basic principle of equal protection, then that legal conclusion 
should not change much based on jurisdiction.  This Comment argues that 
the answer is embedded within the assumptions and themes guiding each 
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 1. See infra Part III; see also Complaint at 3, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 09CV11156 (D. Mass. July 8, 2009) (articulating multiple federal 
constitutional challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act); Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, 
or Other Relief at 1–2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-2292 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) 
(articulating a federal equal protection clause challenge to a California constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage). 
 2. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 137, 144, 153–156, 170.   
 4. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 5. Legal realists provide one potentially obvious answer.  It might just depend on who the 
judge is that is interpreting the law.  See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal 
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2008) (discussing the increasing use of empirical work 
to assess the general legal realist claim that judge personality drives outcomes). 
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court‘s moral understanding of discrimination—or, more plainly, why each 
court thinks discrimination is wrong to begin with.6 
Specifically, this Comment looks at a sample of three states—
California,7 Maryland,8 and Iowa.9  The highest court of each state 
adjudicated a state constitutional equal protection challenge to a state law 
excluding same-sex couples from the institution of civil marriage.10  Each 
court formulated a different response to the fairly similar equal protection 
claims.11  This Comment argues that the courts‘ differing conceptions of 
equal protection explain the diversity in results.12  More specifically, the 
result in each case largely turned on whether the court subscribed to a 
―result-based,‖ ―process-based,‖ or ―expressive-based‖ understanding of 
discrimination.13  California and Maryland subscribed to a result-based 
understanding of discrimination that led to a denial of marriage rights to 
same-sex couples.14  By contrast, Iowa subscribed to a process-based 
understanding of discrimination and extended marriage rights to same-sex 
couples.15  While no court subscribed to an expressive understanding of 
discrimination, some courts discussed and dismissed the arguments in favor 
of such a theory.16 
Part I emphasizes the importance of moral theories of discrimination in 
looking at legal questions, particularly those in relation to equal 
protection.17  Part II presents the three theories of discrimination and then 
discusses a particular scholarly account of each theory.18  Part III describes 
the cases and opinions from each state—California, Maryland, and Iowa.19  
Part IV analyzes the legal reasoning of each opinion to determine which 
theory of discrimination each state adopted.20  The Comment concludes in 
Part V by describing the implications of this analysis for the gay marriage 
culture war being fought in the courts.21 
 
 6. See infra Parts II, IV. 
 7. See infra Parts III.A, IV.A. 
 8. See infra Parts III.B, IV.B. 
 9. See infra Parts III.C, IV.C. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 137, 144, 153–156, 170.  
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part IV.  
 14. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part IV.C. 
 16. See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
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I.  WHAT CAN MORAL THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION TELL US? 
In the broader context of equal protection, the way one answers the 
question ―why is discrimination morally problematic?‖ shapes the legal 
conclusion.22  This Part explains why this is true. 
Drawing distinctions among groups of people is inevitable and 
necessary, especially in the context of public policy.23  Accepting this basic 
truth, how does one know if a distinction is illegitimate discrimination or 
smart policymaking?24  A theory of discrimination can help answer that 
question.25  In an extreme example, say a disease rips through New York 
and the federal government designs a policy to prevent the disease from 
spreading.  A policy that prevents anyone who (1) has the disease, and (2) 
lives in New York from leaving the state is probably sufficient to 
substantially achieve the State‘s goal.26  The policy‘s classification—
diseased people in New York—properly ―fits‖ the Government‘s purpose of 
preventing the disease from spreading.27 
The moral dilemma arises in determining how and why the 
Government draws the distinction.28  Suppose the policy discussed above 
mandated that everyone except poor African-American women could leave 
the city (without determining whether they had the disease).  The response 
would likely be outrage, particularly if the distinction were drawn without 
any clear justification in light of the factual circumstances.29  And if people 
knew that the disease affected all people equally regardless of gender, race, 
or class, then the moral outrage would be more defined—one would 
 
 22. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 4 (2008) (noting that the 
law itself does not answer whether a particular classification targeting a group of individuals is 
permissible). 
 23. Id. at 3–4. 
 24. See id. at 4 (noting that statutory and constitutional law do not provide a complete answer 
to this question because there are ―other important issues‖ that determine whether something 
ought to be illegal). 
 25. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 14–15 
(2003) (arguing that generalizations that have ―not a shred of evidence‖ are one way to determine 
whether a particular trait, like sexual orientation, is completely irrelevant to a favorable 
characteristic, like courage, and is therefore arbitrary); see also infra Part III. 
 26. See HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 115 (characterizing this problem as whether the 
classificatory trait ―fits‖ the purpose of the law or acts as an appropriate proxy for another trait). 
 27. See id. (noting that rational classifications are ones in which the proxy trait ―positively 
correlate[s] with the target trait‖ or purpose). 
 28. Id. at 4–5; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 
2417 (1994) (arguing that discrimination that is statistically accurate and economically efficient 
may still condemn women or African-Americans to inequality).  
 29. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 357–58 (1949) (arguing that the less relevant a classification is to the achievement of its 
objective, the more it may ―offend‖ the ―constitutional safeguard‖). 
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probably ask not only whether the policy is effective, but also whether it is 
fair to target only this population.30 
There are a few different reasons why it would be morally problematic 
to target only poor African-American women to prevent the disease from 
spreading.31  The classification could be so narrow that it is ineffective and 
thus fails a basic test of rationality.32  Or it could exacerbate the preexisting 
social immobility associated with the socioeconomic and racial status of 
this group of women.33  Alternatively, the policy could be interpreted as an 
expression of the Government‘s lack of interest in caring for the rights of 
poor African-American women as opposed to, say, wealthier Caucasian 
men.34  The variety of answers demonstrates the importance of 
understanding why discrimination is wrong.  Moral theories of 
discrimination attempt to categorize, explain, and clarify the intuitive 
responses that people may have to a problematic distinction.35 
In the broader context of equal protection, the way one answers the 
question ―why is this form of discrimination morally problematic?‖ shapes 
the legal debates surrounding the guarantee of equal protection under the 
law.36  As Justice Holmes noted, ―[T]he prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the 
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal 
more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed.‖37 
Similarly, moral theories of discrimination clarify the jumbled 
instinctual responses that people, including judges, experience when they 
face questionable distinctions made between populations, particularly those 
 
 30. See id. at 346–47 (characterizing this category of problems—using certain classifications 
to combat a certain problem—as the ―relation of the Trait to the Mischief‖).  But see HELLMAN, 
supra note 22, at 117 (arguing that some rational and accurate classifications can still be morally 
troubling). 
 31. See infra Part II. 
 32. This is the problem of under-inclusion.  See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 348. 
 33. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2429 (―[W]e should ask ‗Does the law or practice in 
question contribute to the maintenance of second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for 
blacks or women?‘‖). 
 34. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 13 (2000) (―A legal classification violates Equal Protection if the meaning of the law or 
practice in our society at the time conflicts with the government‘s obligation to treat us with equal 
concern.‖). 
 35. See HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 4 (arguing that the question of when it is morally 
problematic to draw distinctions requires a theory that answers the ―moral question‖ of 
discrimination).  
 36. See id. at 4 (noting that the law itself does not truly provide an answer to the question 
regarding the permissibility of a particular classification). 
 37. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (emphasis added). 
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made by governments when formulating social policy.38  These moral 
instincts inevitably shape the process of legal reasoning.39 
Same-sex marriage is a particularly appropriate subject for a 
discussion of moral theory and discrimination because a court‘s moral 
intuitions on the question of discrimination likely shape the way that court 
views marriage discrimination against same-sex couples.40 
II.  THREE SAMPLES OF MORAL THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 
This Part provides a brief description of three theories of 
discrimination—the ―result-based,‖41 ―process-based,‖42 and ―expressive-
based‖ theories.43  Each theory provides an account of when discrimination 
is wrong, but each applies a different method in determining when a 
particular form of discrimination is objectionable, immoral, or invalid.44  
Before discussing each theory, it is important to acknowledge that all three 
theories accept that some discrimination is inevitable because policymaking 
requires drawing distinctions or granting special benefits to particular 
groups of individuals.45 
A.  Result-Based Theories of Discrimination 
This Section will begin with a general discussion of result-based 
theories.  Next, it will discuss and attempt to explain a prominent example 
of result-based theories, distinguish that example from some other 
prominent theories, and conclude with a discussion of the treatment of 
sexual orientation discrimination under that particular theory. 
If one were to conceptualize discrimination as a timeline, the result-
based theorists‘ focus would be on the end of the timeline, or the effect of 
 
 38. If one accepts that moral intuitions play a role in shaping how lawyers and judges respond 
to legal arguments, then having a comprehensible moral theory can help clarify the reasons why 
certain legal arguments are deemed particularly persuasive.  See R. George Wright, The Role of 
Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1420–21 (2006) (―Crucially, an 
opinion accompanying an intuitionist outcome can itself amount to reasonable evidence that the 
judge has taken full, careful, empathetic, and detailed account of all of the main interests and 
concerns of the opposing and other affected parties.‖). 
 39. Id. at 1384. 
 40. See infra Part III. 
 41. See infra Part II.A. 
 42. See infra Part II.B. 
 43. See infra Part II.C. 
 44. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
(1996) (classifying antidiscrimination theorists into two schools—―process-based theories‖ and 
―result-based theories‖).  But see Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 247, 250 (2003) (arguing that expressivism is a ―potentially powerful 
approach‖ to resolving equal protection claims).  
 45. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 29; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 343. 
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the discriminating act.46  Result-based theorists typically focus on the effect 
a law may have on a particular social group.47  There are, of course, 
different effects that discrimination can have and different cultural 
meanings that are tied up with those effects.48  For example, discrimination 
can ―generate[] a feeling of inferiority‖—a psychological or emotional 
effect—in a particular group.49  It can create a stigmatic effect, where the 
discriminating act contributes to a corruption of the target‘s identity that is 
related to the target‘s race, sex, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic 
class.50 
Professor Cass Sunstein‘s ―anticaste principle‖ is a prominent example 
of result-based theories.51  He argues that legal and social practices that 
target ―morally irrelevant differences‖ in a way that creates or contributes to 
―second-class citizenship‖ should be invalid.52  Thus, in his view, a law is 
objectionable on grounds of equal protection if it contributes to a caste 
system.53  Castes are the result of systemic (and systematic) inequalities in 
multiple spheres—for example, poverty, employment, or political power.54  
If systemic inequality exists in these spheres, then it is likely that the group 
on the worse side of the differential treatment is the subject of caste-like 
treatment.55  Professor Sunstein identifies African-Americans as one 
example of a caste.56 
The problem with systemic differences is that they produce ―frequent 
injuries to self-respect,‖ or stigma.57  The denial of basic respect associated 
with the stigma is also a component of living under a caste system—it may 
 
 46. For example, Professor Sunstein explains that policies that contribute to or exacerbate the 
effects of second-class citizenship should be invalid under equal protection principles.  Sunstein, 
supra note 28, at 2411; see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (arguing that 
school segregation has the effect of ―generat[ing] a feeling of inferiority‖ in African-American 
students).   
 47. The social group is usually one that has been historically disadvantaged.  HELLMAN, 
supra note 22, at 22. 
 48. See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 57 (arguing that result-based theorists are 
focused on the ―cultural meaning‖ of discrimination). 
 49. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 50. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 68 (discussing how the stigmatized person internalizes 
his or her deviant status). 
 51. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2410. 
 52. Id. at 2455. 
 53. Id. at 2429. 
 54. Id. at 2430. 
 55. Id. at 2429. 
 56. Id. at 2444 (noting that empirical evidence can help identify what groups should be 
considered castes). 
 57. Id. at 2430. 
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even be evidence of a caste system.58  In essence, the argument is that no 
group should be made into second-class citizens, especially if the 
distinction used to create that second-class citizenship is a morally 
irrelevant one like race or sex.59 
Professor Sunstein‘s theory, like most result-based theories, is distinct 
from analyses that focus on the intentions of the individual or body that 
instituted the discrimination.60  While lower castes may be the target of 
discriminatory policies because of ill intentions, the anticaste principle 
would place a duty on government to ban legislation that is not at all backed 
by ill intentions if that policy nonetheless furthers systemic and differential 
treatment.61 
The anticaste principle is also distinct from the antidiscrimination 
principle in that a group may not actually be a lower caste even though 
there may be examples of unfair discrimination directed at them.62  
According to Professor Sunstein, homosexuals, for example, are not a lower 
caste because they are not generally worse off than heterosexuals in the 
traditional spheres of social welfare.63  They are, however, the targets of 
discrimination and prejudice.64   
Interestingly, Professor Sunstein has written that same-sex marriage 
bans contribute to a caste system, but a gendered and sex-based caste, not a 
sexual orientation-based caste.65  His argument, relying on social 
psychology, is that a ban on state-recognized same-sex relations (like 
marriage) is an attempt to bolster the ―natural difference[s]‖ between 
women and men.66  Specifically, the ―natural difference[s]‖ are related to 
the role that men and women have in sexual activity.67  The point is to 
―keep males masculine and females feminine.‖68  In essence, the argument 
is that the reason why men cannot marry men is because such a union 
would sanction a sexual relationship where a man would play the role of a 
 
 58. Id. at 2431–32. 
 59. Id. at 2429. 
 60. Id. at 2441. 
 61. Id.  Similarly, the anticaste principle would place a duty on a governmental body to enact 
measures designed to eliminate the caste system—a duty that goes ―well beyond a ban on 
illegitimately motivated legislation.‖  Id. 
 62. Id. at 2443 (noting that Jews and Asian Americans do not count as lower castes). 
 63. Id. at 2443–44. 
 64. Id. at 2444.  Professor Sunstein acknowledges that discrimination against homosexuals 
denigrates them, impacting their self-respect—a critical dimension of the anticaste analysis.  Id. 
 65. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 21–22 (1994). 
 66. Id. at 20–21. 
 67. Id. at 21–22. 
 68. Id. at 21 (quoting Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Laws as Sex 
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145, 159 n.86 (1988) (citation omitted)). 
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woman (the penetrated).69  For a man to take a passive sexual role violates 
certain gender roles that are in place to maintain male supremacy—only 
women, in this system, can play passive sexual roles.70  Thus, Sunstein 
argues that the intolerance of same-sex relations and marriage is the result 
of caste-like treatment of women, who are subject to sexual inequalities 
because of patriarchal conceptions of gender roles based on ―natural 
difference[s].‖71 
B.  Process-Based Theories of Discrimination 
This Section will begin with a general discussion of process-based 
theories, followed by a brief discussion of one example of such theories.  
Next, this Section will look at a few examples demonstrating the theory and 
conclude with a discussion of the treatment of sexual orientation 
discrimination at the theoretical level. 
Following the timeline conceptualization of discrimination, process-
based theories focus on the beginning of the timeline, or the process leading 
up to the implementation of the discriminating act.72  Unlike the result-
based theorists, who accept that there could be a variety of destructive 
discriminatory effects that justify invalidation of a particular practice,73 
process theorists generally agree that a practice is invalid if there is a defect 
in the decisionmaking process.74  The defect is almost universally the 
incorporation of some ―contaminating element,‖ like bias against a 
particular group, a desire to harm, animus, or an irrational generalization.75   
For example, footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.76 is a fairly clear (though brief) articulation of the concerns of process-
based theorists and represents the Supreme Court‘s acceptance of process-
based theory in the context of the federal Equal Protection Clause.77  In the 
now-famous footnote, the Court states that ―prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.‖78 
 
 69. Id. at 21–22. 
 70. Id. at 22.  
 71. Id. at 21–22. 
 72. KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 55. 
 73. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 74. KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 55. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 153 n.4 
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Essentially, incorporating prejudice into the political process 
contaminates the process, producing defective results that could harm the 
very minorities the political process should protect.79  Footnote four was the 
basis for the development of the current federal equal protection doctrine‘s 
emphasis on tying the discriminatory impact of a particular act to a 
discriminatory purpose.80 
In another manifestation of the process-based analysis, Professors 
Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek have argued that a law‘s 
classification must be ―reasonably related‖ to the purpose of the law.81  A 
law generally has one of two purposes—achieving some public good or 
eliminating an evil.82  Under this framework, a valid law that uses a 
reasonable classification to eliminate a particular evil would have to include 
in the classification all persons ―similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of the law.‖83   
One example of a law that classifies to eliminate an evil would be a 
law designed to eliminate hereditary criminality.84  Assuming that the law 
tries to eliminate hereditary criminality by sterilizing criminals, Professors 
Tussman and tenBroek argue that such a classification—all transmitters—
would be ―reasonable‖ because it includes everyone who is ―similarly 
situated‖ with regard to the purpose of the law.85  An unreasonable 
classification in this example would be a classification that is ―under-
inclusive,‖ like a law that sterilizes only hereditary criminals from Alabama 
while ignoring all other hereditary criminals.86  Another manifestation of 
unreasonable classification would be an ―over-inclusive‖ one, where the 
classification targets a group of individuals larger than necessary to achieve 
its objective.87  For example, placing all Americans of Japanese ancestry in 
internment camps to prevent Japanese spies from leaving the United States 
is an over-inclusive classification because not all Japanese-Americans are 
spies.88 
According to Professors Tussman and tenBroek, the focus on the 
relationship between the classification and its purpose is designed to smoke 
 
 79. Id.; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 17. 
 80. KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 15, 17 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 
(1976)). 
 81. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 346. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 347.  The offspring of criminals, the argument goes, are more likely to commit 
crimes because of some genetic predisposition.  Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 348. 
 87. Id. at 351. 
 88. Id. 
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out illegitimate motivations that could be driving the legislation‘s 
classification.89  For example, a classification that was ―wholly irrelevant‖ 
to fulfilling the purpose of the law would be arbitrary.90  The motivation of 
an arbitrary classification is not easily discernible and likely without any 
rational basis.91  Therefore, arbitrary classifications are invalid.92  To 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek, such cases are not far removed from 
cases involving a purely hostile motive, like a law denying a person the 
right to have a job because of hatred of the person‘s race.93  In both cases, 
the classification is not ―reasonably related‖ to any particular purpose—an 
arbitrary classification that has no relation to the purpose of the law is the 
same as a law solely driven by pure hostility.94  Both are invalid.95 
Ultimately, under this theory, the prohibition against discriminatory 
legislation focuses on the motive of the legislator.96  If the motive is rooted 
in ―hate, prejudice, vengeance, hostility,‖97 or arbitrariness,98 then the 
legislation is invalid.99   
The result for sexual orientation discrimination is fairly clear.100  The 
Supreme Court has held that a constitutional amendment designed to 
prohibit homosexuals from seeking any legislative, executive, or legal 
protection can be reasonably construed as ―born of animosity‖ and is 
therefore invalid under the federal Equal Protection Clause.101  More 
generally, the Court has held that laws that are motivated by a ―desire to 
harm a politically unpopular group‖ are not actually related to any rational 
governmental interest and are therefore invalid under equal protection 
principles.102  The more complicated problem of same-sex marriage bans 
will be addressed in more detail below.103  
 
 89. Id. at 358 (―[T]he prohibition against discriminatory legislation is a demand for purity of 
motive.‖). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 358–59, 361. 
 97. Id. at 358. 
 98. Id. at 361 (noting that if there is no ―conceivable justification‖ for discrimination against a 
particular group, then the statute sanctioning such discrimination should be held invalid). 
 99. Id. at 358–59. 
 100. See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 89, 93 (1997) (discussing how process-based theory in federal Equal Protection Clause doctrine 
accommodates measures that have a clear anti-gay purpose).  
 101. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
 102. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 103. See infra Part III. 
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C.  Expressive-Based Theories of Discrimination 
This Section will begin with a general discussion of expressive-based 
theories and will discuss a prominent example of such theories.  Next, it 
will distinguish that example from some other theories and conclude with a 
discussion of the treatment of sexual orientation discrimination. 
Expressive-based theories of discrimination carve a sort of middle path 
between process-based and result-based theories.104  In the 
conceptualization of discrimination as a timeline, the focus is on the act at 
the moment of implementation or the sort of signal that the act sends out.105  
In the context of equal protection, the concern of this theory is whether the 
―meaning or expressive character‖ of a practice signals that a particular 
group of people matters less to the legislator or government.106 
Professor Deborah Hellman, a proponent of an expressive 
understanding of equal protection, has argued that a distinction is morally 
problematic when it demeans a group or person affected.107  She begins 
with the ―bedrock moral principle‖ that each person has an ―equal moral 
worth.‖108  She extends this assumption to say that the Government cannot 
express a message of unequal moral worth by giving the impression that 
one group of people is worth less than another group of people.109  The 
worry associated with drawing distinctions among people is that doing so 
will communicate or send a message that certain individuals are worth less 
than others.110  Because some differential treatment is inevitable, the 
important question is whether certain styles of differential treatment rob 
 
 104. Hellman, supra note 34, at 2. 
 105. See id. at 1–3 (arguing that the heart of equal protection is the ―social meaning‖ of 
unequal protection, or that unequal treatment signifies that those individuals are of lesser concern 
to the state). 
 106. Id. at 68; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1525 (2000) (―The expressive meaning of 
a particular act or practice, then, need not be in the agent‘s head, the recipient‘s head, or even in 
the heads of the general public.  Expressive meanings are socially constructed.  These meanings 
are a result of the ways in which actions fit with (or fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and 
practices in the community.‖). 
 107. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 7–8 (―Whether a particular distinction does demean is 
determined by the meaning of drawing such a distinction in that context, in our culture, at this 
time.  In focusing on whether a distinction demeans, this account does not rest on the 
consequences or the effects of a classification.  Rather, some classifications demean—whether or 
not the person affected feels demeaned, stigmatized, or harmed.  As such, this account of wrongful 
discrimination grounds moral impermissibility in the wrong rather than the harm of 
discrimination.‖). 
 108. Id. at 6. 
 109. Hellman, supra note 34, at 10. 
 110. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 7. 
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individuals of their equal moral worth.111  An act that is demeaning or 
denigrating denies someone his or her equal moral worth.112 
A demeaning act has a ―social dimension‖ and a ―power 
dimension.‖113  History and culture inform the ―social dimension‖ of the 
analysis.114  The status of the speaker in relation to those affected by the 
discrimination informs the ―power dimension‖ of the analysis.115  A 
governmental act is demeaning if both elements are satisfied.116  An action 
that distinguishes on the basis of certain characteristics is demeaning if the 
discriminatory treatment expresses the unequal moral worth of the 
individuals with those characteristics and if the group or individual 
adopting the classification ―has sufficient power or status such that its 
actions can put others down.‖117 
This theory of demeaning discrimination is distinct from the ―caste‖ 
theory or other result-based theories of discrimination because it shifts the 
focus of the analysis away from the effect of the discrimination to the 
expressive character of the discrimination.118  An individual does not have 
to be a member of a caste to feel demeaned.119  Instead, the act is 
demeaning if it expresses a person‘s unequal moral worth regardless of her 
social reality or the existence of a caste system.120  For example, if there 
were no disparities in any of the social welfare indices relevant to the 
determination of caste status, then ordering African-Americans to the back 
of the bus would probably be valid under the anticaste theory because it 
would not entrench existing hierarchies based on racial difference.121  Yet, 
the act would still be demeaning because it would denigrate African-
 
 111. Id. at 29. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 35. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 42.  Some scholars emphasize one part of the test over others.  See, e.g., Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 356 (1987) (noting that ―evidence regarding the historical and social context‖ 
of the governmental act is the key to determining the symbolic meaning of an act). 
 117. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 42.  This is the ―power‖ dimension.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 27. 
 119. Cf. Hellman, supra note 34, at 21 (noting that the expressive character of a practice and a 
caste-focused analysis can intersect at some point because one must look to the social reality—
like existence of a caste system—to determine if the expressive meaning of the practice is 
somewhat coherent and fits social reality). 
 120. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 23. 
 121. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2443–44 (acknowledging that discriminatory acts directed 
at non-castes—like Jews, Asian-Americans, or homosexuals—would violate some equality 
principle, but not the anticaste principle, because it focuses on showing the existence of second-
class citizenship in social welfare). 
2010] THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 13 
Americans, considering their long and complicated history with segregation 
in public transportation.122 
The expressive-based theory is also distinct from process-based 
theories of discrimination for two more reasons.  First, process-based 
theories evaluate the motivation of the legislator and the ―fit‖ between the 
classification and the purpose of the law, something unrelated to the 
expressive-based theory‘s central question concerning equal moral 
worth.123  Second, the expressive-based theory does not give the motivation 
of the legislator the same amount of weight in determining whether a 
particular act is demeaning.124 
The implications of adopting an expressive-based theory for sexual 
orientation discrimination remain unclear.  Part of the lack of clarity is due 
to the fact that making determinations about what is demeaning is an 
interpretive exercise and there is some inevitable interpretive gray area 
about whether something is demeaning.125  An analysis of various ―aspects 
of society and culture‖ may suggest that a particular discriminatory act 
targeting homosexuals might be demeaning.126  Some consider 
discrimination against homosexuals to be ―pervasive‖ throughout society in 
a way unlike discrimination against women or African-Americans.127  
Alternatively, one may adopt the prevalent view that homosexuals are 
wealthy, overwhelmingly Caucasian, and live in urban areas, and conclude 
that gay rights issues are a concern of the bourgeoisie.128  Thus, an 
expressivist may not find that any discriminatory act is truly denigrating.129  
Instead, an expressivist may conclude that discriminatory acts directed at 
homosexuals may be rightfully designed to prevent homosexuals from 
claiming ―special rights,‖ or rights that they do not need that would 
overload the court system.130  The implication of adopting expressivism for 
sexual orientation discrimination is unclear because both interpretive results 
 
 122. Cf. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 23, 27 (―Though the status of the group may be 
relevant . . . , it ought to be relevant in a way that allows us to maintain that a wrong is done to the 
individual and not just to the group.‖). 
 123. See id. at 20 (―[Irrationality] is a reason to get rid of the idiots (to vote them out or 
whatever) who adopt irrational criteria, but no more.‖). 
 124. Id. at 143; Hellman, supra note 34, at 59. 
 125. Hellman, supra note 34, at 58 (discussing the anti-gay Colorado constitutional amendment 
at issue in Romer). 
 126. Id. at 59 (discussing Romer). 
 127. KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 148–49. 
 128. Kate Kendell, Race, Same-Sex Marriage, and White Privilege: The Problem with Civil 
Rights Analogies, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 135 (2005). 
 129. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―It is also 
nothing short of preposterous to call ‗politically unpopular‘ a group which enjoys enormous 
influence in American media and politics . . . .‖). 
 130. Kendell, supra note 128, at 136. 
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seem possible.  The implication for marriage discrimination is likely 
similarly unclear, and will be discussed in more detail below.131 
III.  A SUMMARY OF THE CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, AND IOWA HIGH STATE 
COURT OPINIONS 
This Part discusses the reasoning of three state courts that have 
addressed the question of whether same-sex marriage bans are 
constitutional under equal protection principles.  The first Section discusses 
the Supreme Court of California‘s case assessing the constitutionality of a 
state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.132  The second 
Section discusses the Maryland Court of Appeals‘s case assessing the 
constitutionality of a Maryland statute restricting marriage to heterosexual 
couples.133  The third Section discusses the Supreme Court of Iowa‘s case 
assessing the constitutionality of an Iowa statute restricting marriage to 
heterosexual couples.134  Because this Comment analyzes theories of 
discrimination and equal protection, a discussion of other constitutional 
theories such as due process is omitted.  A discussion of the 
constitutionality of these same-sex marriage bans under sex and gender 
discrimination is also omitted.135 
A.  California 
In Strauss v. Horton,136 the Supreme Court of California assessed the 
legal validity of Proposition 8, a constitutional initiative designed to 
eliminate the recognition of same-sex marriage.137  To assess the validity of 
a constitutional amendment under the California Constitution, the court had 
to determine whether Proposition 8 was an appropriate ―amendment‖ or an 
impermissible ―revision.‖138  In California, an amendment can be adopted 
 
 131. See infra Part IV. 
 132. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009); see infra Part III.A. 
 133. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007); see infra Part III.B. 
 134. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see infra Part III.C. 
 135. The question of whether same-sex marriage bans are a form of sex or gender 
discrimination is not a simple debate to resolve and is outside the scope of this Comment.  See, 
e.g., Conaway, 401 Md. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586 (finding that the same-sex marriage ban is not 
about sex or gender-based discrimination).  All three courts agree that same-sex marriage bans 
classify on the basis of sexual orientation.  Strauss, 207 P.3d at 102; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 884; 
Conaway, 401 Md. at 277, 932 A.2d at 605.  That agreement makes a clearer foundation for a 
comparative discussion than does the issue of whether same-sex marriage bans constitute sex or 
gender discrimination.  See, e.g., id. at 246, 932 A.2d at 586. 
 136. 207 P.3d 48. 
 137. Id. at 59.  Proposition 8 added a section to the California Constitution designed to 
overrule a California Supreme Court ruling that extended marriage rights to same-sex couples.  Id. 
at 75. 
 138. Id. at 79–80. 
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through an initiative petition or by a required vote of the Legislature.139  By 
contrast, a revision can be proposed by required vote of the Legislature or 
by a constitutional convention.140  A revision cannot be adopted through the 
initiative procedure.141  The case thus turned on the court‘s characterization 
of Proposition 8 as an amendment or a revision.142 
The court held that Proposition 8 was an amendment and not a 
revision.143  The court reasoned that while Proposition 8 modified the 
State‘s constitutional regime governing same-sex couples, the couples still 
retained ―the same broad protections under the state equal protection 
clause,‖ including status as a suspect class and the corresponding strict 
scrutiny standard of review.144  Because the court believed that the heart of 
the State‘s guarantee of equal protection still applied to same-sex couples 
and homosexuals more generally, it was comfortable accepting that the only 
tangible impact of Proposition 8 was withholding the word ―marriage‖ from 
same-sex couples.145  Thus, the court characterized Proposition 8 ―as 
creating a limited exception to the state equal protection clause.‖146 
The court also rejected the argument that Proposition 8 struck at the 
―foundational constitutional principle of equal protection‖ because it 
subjected the rights of the gay and lesbian minority to the heterosexual 
majority.147  The court first noted that an initiative is dubbed a ―revision‖ 
only when it causes a ―fundamental change in the nature of the 
governmental plan or framework established by the Constitution.‖148  
Because ―fundamental change‖ is the touchstone of the amendment/revision 
analysis, the court logically relied on its ―limited exception‖ 
characterization of Proposition 8 to conclude that Proposition 8 was not 
―fundamental‖ enough to constitute a revision of the California 
Constitution.149 
The court‘s narrow characterization of the equal protection issue was 
influenced by its understanding of the right that same-sex couples retained 
 
 139. Id. at 79. 
 140. Id. at 79–80. 
 141. Id. at 80. 
 142. Id. at 79–80 
 143. Id. at 78. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008) (holding that 
withholding the designation of ―marriage‖ from same-sex couples violated those couples‘ right to 
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the California Constitution). 
 147. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 99–100. 
 148. Id. at 100. 
 149. Id. at 99–100. 
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despite Proposition 8—the right to an officially recognized relationship.150  
This understanding made the court‘s equal protection reasoning more 
persuasive because, in the end, same-sex couples had only lost the word 
―marriage,‖ not the rights, benefits, and/or privileges of a state-sanctioned 
relationship or suspect classification and strict scrutiny.151 
B.  Maryland 
In Conaway v. Deane,152 the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a 
state statutory provision that provided that ―[o]nly a marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid in this State.‖153  The court held that the statute 
(1) did not infringe on a ―fundamental right to [same-sex] marriage,‖154 (2) 
did not discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the Maryland 
Constitution,155 and (3) survived rational basis review under Maryland 
equal protection doctrine.156  
With regard to the equal protection claim based on sexual orientation, 
the court made two critical holdings.  First, it found that sexual orientation 
is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class.157  Thus, classifications based on 
sexual orientation must satisfy only rational basis review, the lowest form 
of scrutiny.158  Second, applying rational basis review, it reasoned that the 
State had a ―legitimate governmental interest‖ in ―fostering procreation‖ 
that was furthered by the restriction of marriage to same-sex couples.159   
In determining whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class, the 
court made two analytical moves.  First, the court found that homosexuals 
were not politically powerless enough to qualify as a suspect class because 
gay rights initiatives on issues like fair housing, employment non-
discrimination, education, and public accommodation had a recent history 
of success in Maryland.160  Second, after surveying the relevant literature, 
 
 150. Id. at 61–62. 
 151. Id.; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Same Sex Marriage: An Essential Step Towards Equality, 34 
SW. U. L. REV. 579, 584 (2005) (noting that by statute, unmarried same-sex couples in California 
in comparable institutions, like domestic partnerships, retain many—though not all—of the 
benefits of married heterosexual couples and that a key component of the public relations effort 
must be to convince people why civil unions still deprive same-sex couples of tangible benefits 
and create hardship). 
 152. 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007). 
 153. Id. at 237 n.1, 932 A.2d at 581 n.1; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2006). 
 154. Conaway, 401 Md. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 277, 932 A.2d at 606. 
 158. Id. at 315, 932 A.2d at 629. 
 159. Id. at 317, 932 A.2d at 630. 
 160. Id. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611–12. 
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the court found that sexual orientation is not an immutable trait because 
there is no ―generally accepted scientific conclusion‖ on the question of 
immutability.161  Looking at those two factors, the court concluded that 
homosexuality is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and therefore 
classifications based on sexual orientation require rational basis review.162 
Applying rational basis review, the court concluded that there was a 
―sufficient link‖ between the State‘s interest in ―fostering a stable 
environment for procreation‖ and excluding same-sex couples from the 
institution of marriage.163  The court noted that marriage enjoys such a 
unique legal status largely due to the fact that procreation occurs within the 
confines of marriage.164  The court acknowledged that excluding same-sex 
couples from the institution of marriage was both an over- and under-
inclusive attempt to achieve the State‘s goal of promoting procreation.165  
But the court concluded that rational basis review requires deference to the 
state legislature and does not require ―mathematical exactitude‖ in 
determining whether the State was achieving its objective.166  
The court also explicitly rejected the proposition that it should fashion 
a remedy providing same-sex couples with the ―various rights and benefits‖ 
available to opposite-sex couples in Maryland under a civil union-style 
system.167  Somewhat counter-intuitively, the court interpreted the 
appellees‘ arguments about how a marriage-civil union dichotomy would 
inflict ―dignitary harm‖ on same-sex couples to mean that those couples 
wanted no part of a civil union system even if they could not have marriage 
rights.168 
C.  Iowa 
In Varnum v. Brien,169 the Supreme Court of Iowa unanimously held 
that a statutory provision excluding same-sex couples from the institution of 
civil marriage violated the Iowa Constitution‘s equal protection 
provision.170  The court took several steps in reaching its conclusion.  First, 
the court reasoned that same-sex and heterosexual couples are similarly 
situated with respect to the Iowa marriage law‘s purpose ―of providing an 
 
 161. Id. at 294, 932 A.2d at 616. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 317–18, 932 A.2d at 630. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 323, 932 A.2d at 634. 
 166. Id. at 322, 932 A.2d at 633. 
 167. Id. at 324 n.71, 932 A.2d at 634 n.71. 
 168. See id. 
 169. 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 170. Id. at 906–07. 
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institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and 
responsibilities of persons in organized society.‖171  The court noted that 
the plaintiffs (same-sex couples) were, like heterosexual couples, in serious 
romantic relationships and simply desired the ―sense of order‖ that the 
institution of civil marriage brings to heterosexual relationships.172 
Second, the court found that the statute classified on the basis of 
sexual orientation because obtaining access to same-sex marriage is so 
―closely correlated with being homosexual‖ that the law clearly targeted 
gays and lesbians as a class.173  According to the court, denying the right of 
same-sex marriage to heterosexuals was such a useless enterprise that the 
law was clearly designed to prevent homosexuals from marrying.174 
Third, the court reasoned that intermediate scrutiny had to be applied 
to laws that classify based on sexual orientation because such classification 
was likely to be grounded in ―‗prejudice and antipathy‘‖ and/or reflect 
―irrelevant stereotypes.‖175  The court analyzed four factors—the history of 
invidious discrimination, the ability to contribute to society, the 
immutability of sexual orientation, and political power as a class—and 
concluded that gays and lesbians, as a minority group, ―continue[] to suffer 
the enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination,‖ and 
therefore laws targeting them required intermediate judicial scrutiny.176 
Fourth, the court concluded that the ban on same-sex marriage failed 
intermediate scrutiny because the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil 
marriage did not ―substantially further‖ any of the stated objectives of the 
law.177  The court reasoned as follows: (1) there was no causal relation 
between expanding the institution of civil marriage to include same-sex 
couples and undermining the ―traditional institution‖ of marriage;178 (2) 
excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage was both under- and over-
inclusive in promoting the ―optimal environment to raise children‖;179 (3) 
 
 171. Id. at 883 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 
341 (Iowa 1983)). 
 172. Id. at 883–84. 
 173. Id. at 884–85. 
 174. Id. at 885. 
 175. Id. at 886 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 
(1985)). 
 176. Id. at 895–96 (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 
2008)). 
 177. Id. at 904.  The stated governmental objectives of the law were ―maintaining traditional 
marriage,‖ ―promotion of optimal environment to raise children,‖ ―promotion of procreation,‖ 
―promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships,‖ and ―conservation of resources.‖  Id. at 898–
99, 901–02. 
 178. Id. at 898–99. 
 179. Id. at 900.  The court reasoned that the ban was under-inclusive because other groups of 
potential parents like sexual predators or child abusers were not also excluded from the institution 
of civil marriage.  Id.  The court reasoned that the ban was over-inclusive because not all same-sex 
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there was no causal relation between excluding gay and lesbian couples 
from civil marriage and encouraging stability in heterosexual 
relationships;180 and (4) excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage 
was an over- and under-inclusive attempt to conserve state resources.181 
IV.  ANALYSIS: MORAL THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
CALIFORNIA, MARYLAND, AND IOWA OPINIONS 
This Part will attempt to determine which moral theory of 
discrimination each court adopted in assessing the respective equal 
protection claims brought before it.  The Part begins with the California 
Supreme Court‘s opinion,182 moves to the Maryland Court of Appeals‘s 
opinion,183 and ends with the Iowa Supreme Court‘s opinion.184 
A.  California 
The California Supreme Court relied on a result-based analysis of the 
equal protection issue.  There are three components to this analysis.  First, 
the court‘s focus on the rights that gay couples retained despite the 
amendment‘s restrictions strongly suggests that the court adopted a result-
based analysis of the equal protection issue.185  Second, this consequential 
focus implicitly rejects the concerns of process-based theorists.186  Third, 
the court‘s refusal to engage the dissent‘s expressive argument suggests a 
complete disinterest in the expressive character of the law and a rejection of 
the associated theory of discrimination.187 
First, the court‘s focus on the protections that same-sex couples 
retained despite the restriction on the designation of marriage suggests that 
the court adhered to a result-based theory of discrimination.188  
Specifically, because suspect classification and strict scrutiny still protect 
same-sex couples, the court seemed more comfortable finding the marriage 
 
couples choose to have children.  Id. at 900–01.  It made little sense to punish couples who did not 
want children by denying them access to an ―optimal‖ environment for raising children.  Id. 
 180. Id. at 902. 
 181. Id. at 903–04.  The court reasoned that the ban was over-inclusive because same-sex 
couples would not use more state resources than they previously used as unmarried couples.  Id. at 
903.  The court reasoned that the ban was under-inclusive because if the State genuinely wanted to 
conserve resources, it could have denied civil marriage to a much larger segment of the 
population—not just the 5800 same-sex couples in Iowa.  Id. at 903.  
 182. See infra Part IV.A. 
 183. See infra Part IV.B. 
 184. See infra Part IV.C. 
 185. See infra notes 188–191 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra notes 192–204 and accompanying text. 
 187. See infra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
 188. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 78 (Cal. 2009). 
20 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 69:1 
restriction valid.189  Similarly, same-sex couples were still guaranteed all 
the rights associated with marriage under the Due Process Clause—they 
simply could not have the designation of ―marriage.‖190  These 
observations suggest that the court was applying a cruder version of the 
anticaste theory—the court essentially reasoned that there was not enough 
of a disparity in the legal treatment of same-sex and heterosexual 
relationships to find that withholding the designation ―marriage‖ was 
objectionable to equal protection principles.191   
Second, even the court‘s narrow framing of the issue—that all the 
amendment really did was withhold the word ―marriage‖ from same-sex 
couples while leaving intact the statutory and constitutional benefits of 
marriage—suggests that the court was more focused on the effect of 
withholding the word ―marriage‖ than on the intent in doing so.192  
Similarly, the court refused to engage in an analysis of the voters‘ intent or 
the purpose of the amendment as related to the equal protection 
argument,193 even acknowledging that California had a history of allowing 
a majority of voters to restrict the constitutional rights of a minority group 
with a history of past discrimination.194   
There is an argument that the court implicitly applied a sort of 
―reasonable fit‖ and intent-based analysis similar to the one proposed by 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek.195  The court noted that the stated 
purpose of the measure was to ―restore the traditional definition of 
marriage,‖ not to ―eliminate the constitutional right of same-sex couples to 
establish an officially recognized family relationship.‖196  Using this 
characterization, the court then reasoned that withholding the term 
―marriage‖ was a limited exception to the ―core set‖ of rights associated 
with marriage.197  The result is a subtle process-based analysis, where the 
 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id. at 75.  But see Chemerinsky, supra note 151, at 584 (contrasting the Massachusetts 
legal regime governing same-sex couples before the decision legalizing same-sex marriage with 
the Californian regime and arguing that civil unions still deprive same-sex couples of tangible 
benefits and create hardship). 
 191. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 78 (finding that same-sex couples retain the same ―broad 
protections,‖ such as equal protection, privacy, and due process, as heterosexual couples); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2443–44 (noting that homosexuals are not a caste). 
 192. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 77–78 (concluding that same-sex couples are still entitled to the same 
―respect and dignity‖ of a couple in a marriage because they ―retain the same substantive 
protections embodied in the state constitutional rights of privacy and due process‖). 
 193. See id. at 105 (refusing to read into the amendment process an equal protection element 
that would prevent a majority of Californians from stripping ―one aspect‖ of a fundamental right 
of a suspect class). 
 194. Id. at 103. 
 195. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 358. 
 196. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 76. 
 197. Id. at 77. 
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dual purpose of restoring traditional marriage while maintaining core 
pseudo-marriage rights was squared with the mechanism, withholding the 
word ―marriage‖ from same-sex couples.198 
This reading does not ultimately support the claim that the California 
Supreme Court used a process-based analysis.  The court acknowledged in 
a footnote that a more sweeping initiative measure that would have 
eliminated any government benefits similar to marriage benefits did not 
gain enough signatures for the ballot.199  One reading of the court‘s 
assessment is that had the alternative initiative passed, it may have 
constituted a revision of state equal protection principles.200  Yet, the 
court‘s considerable deference to the democratic process reveals a belief 
that even if a malicious intent or irrational purpose drove the 
amendment,201 respect for the democratic process should nonetheless take 
priority.202  More importantly, the court‘s primary focus on the benefits that 
same-sex couples retained is reminiscent of a result-based analysis because 
it emphasizes the effects of the discriminatory act instead of the rationale 
behind the act.203  Intent was important to the court, but only in the sense of 
what benefits the proponents of Proposition 8 intended to take away.204 
Third, the court seemed unconcerned with the expressive character of 
withholding the word ―marriage‖ from same-sex couples.205  In his dissent, 
 
 198. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 346 (arguing that a reasonable classification is 
one that accurately targets a particular class in order to achieve a statutory purpose); cf. Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding constitutionally problematic a sweeping amendment that 
generally prevented homosexuals from seeking any protection in state or local government in the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branches). 
 199. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 76 n.8. 
 200. See id.  Interestingly, the court compared the two versions of the proposition, using that 
comparison to suggest that the less expansive proposition, the one that was ultimately adopted, 
was only designed to ―restore the traditional definition of marriage,‖ and ―not to abrogate or 
eliminate the constitutional right of same-sex couples to establish an officially recognized family 
relationship.‖  Id. 
 201. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that prejudice 
against minorities in the political process may require heightened judicial skepticism); see also 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 17 (noting that ―process‖ theorists focus on the intended purpose 
of the law to determine its validity); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 358–59 (arguing that 
―the prohibition against discriminatory legislation is a demand for purity of motive‖). 
 202. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 110 (―It is not our role to pass judgment on the wisdom or 
relative merit of the current provisions of the California Constitution governing the means by 
which our state Constitution may be altered.‖). 
 203. See id. at 77; cf. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 871 (Vt. 2000) (noting that the 
Vermont Common Benefits Clause doctrine is distinct from federal equal protection jurisprudence 
because it focuses on ―vigorously ensuring that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable 
relation to the governmental objective‖). 
 204. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 76 n.8. 
 205. Even in hypothesizing more extreme cases that may constitute a revision, the court 
focused on the effects of an amendment that (1) deprives a minority group of an entire protection 
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Justice Moreno expressly raised the expressive dimension of the 
amendment, arguing that withholding the word ―marriage‖ from same-sex 
couples—even ones who have many of the same rights as married 
couples—―impinges upon [those couples‘] fundamental interest in having 
their family relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by‖ 
heterosexual couples and brands them as ―second-class citizens.‖206  The 
court sidestepped this argument, noting that the ultimate power rests with 
the people who can make determinations about the content of a state 
constitutional guarantee.207  This move suggests that, for the California 
court, the expressive signal of state constitutional amendments is largely 
unquestionable; the voters have total power to decide the content of the 
amendment during the process of creating the amendment.208  This clear 
rejection of an expressivist understanding of the discriminatory amendment 
suggests that the court‘s focus was primarily on the tangible or material 
results of the amendment and, secondarily, on the procedure of creating the 
amendment.  The derived meaning—or the expressive nature of the 
amendment—is completely absent in this jurisprudence. 
B.  Maryland 
The Maryland Court of Appeals used a hybrid process and result-based 
analysis of the equal protection issue.  There are three components to this 
analysis.  First, the court‘s suspect classification analysis strongly focused 
on the effects of discrimination against homosexuals.209  Second, the 
court‘s focus on the fit between the legislation‘s purpose (furthering 
procreation) and the discriminatory act (excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage) strongly suggests that the court applied a process-based 
framework for its equal protection analysis.210  Third, the court‘s 
misapplication of the ―dignitary harm‖ argument suggests that the court was 
uninterested in entertaining an expressive-based analysis of marriage 
discrimination.211 
 
or right or (2) strips a group of its right to seek public or private protections in the political or 
judicial process.  Id. at 102. 
 206. Id. at 131 (Moreno, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 207. Id. at 114 (majority opinion) (noting that these expressive-style arguments amount to 
nothing more than ―stirring‖ rhetorical flourishes that ignore the absolute authority of 
constitutional amendment). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra notes 23–35 and accompanying text (discussing how the primary focus of 
moral theorists of discrimination is determining whether a distinction is illegitimate discrimination 
or smart policymaking).  
 210. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 317–18, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (2007); see Tussman & 
tenBroek, supra note 29, at 346 (arguing that ―[a] reasonable classification is one which includes 
all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law‖). 
 211. See supra notes 167–168 and accompanying text. 
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Both the process and function of the court‘s suspect classification 
analysis seemed to reflect an anticaste or result-based understanding of 
discrimination and equality.  In process, the court‘s suspect classification 
analysis largely turned on the fact that homosexuals have statutory 
protections in several arenas of social welfare, including ―public 
accommodation, employment, housing, and education.‖212  The protections 
that the court found persuasive were strikingly similar to the factors that 
Professor Sunstein used to assess caste status.213  And functionally, the 
court‘s goal in applying the suspect classification analysis was to build the 
case against classifying homosexuals as a caste.214  For example, the court 
took judicial notice of the history of prejudice against homosexuals,215 yet 
it concluded that homosexuals are too politically powerful to qualify for the 
―extraordinary protection‖ associated with suspect classification.216  These 
findings are confusing because the traditional purpose of the suspect 
classification analysis is to identify groups who are likely to be the subject 
of legislation based on illegitimate motivations and considerations.217  The 
court‘s findings suggest that the court acknowledged that illegitimate 
motivations might be driving the legislation, but ultimately found that 
concern was ―outweighed‖ by the fact that homosexuals are politically 
powerful.218  This implied balancing approach strongly suggests that the 
court was more concerned with the caste-like dimensions of homosexuality 
than it was with the process-based concerns about motivation or the 
expressive character of the legislation.219  To the court, the Maryland 
statutory protections for homosexuals were evidence of the success of 
homosexual activists in eliminating discrimination based on sexual 
 
 212. Conaway, 401 Md. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611.  
 213. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2448–50 (discussing factors, including opportunity in 
education, income and employment, housing, political representation, and vulnerability to crime); 
see also id. at 2441 (acknowledging that suspect classification and lower caste status ―overlap‖ in 
function to smoke out illegitimate motivations driving discriminatory legislation). 
 214. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611 (concluding that homosexuals are not ―so 
politically powerless that they are entitled to ‗extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process‘‖). 
 215. Id. at 285, 932 A.2d at 610. 
 216. Id. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611. 
 217. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2441 (―The notion of suspect classification is based on a fear 
that illegitimate considerations are likely to lie behind legislation, whereas the anticaste principle 
is designed to ensure against second-class status for certain social groups.‖). 
 218. See id. at 2441–42 (arguing that suspect classification and lower caste status are distinct 
ideas because illegitimate motivations may drive legislation discriminating against groups who do 
not count as lower castes, such as Asian-Americans or Jews). 
 219. See id. at 2429 (noting that the emphasis of the anticaste analysis is on systemic 
disadvantage, a type that ―operates along standard and predictable lines in multiple and important 
spheres of life‖ and hampers democratic participation). 
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orientation.220  Thus, homosexuals were ―not enough‖ of a caste to qualify 
as a suspect class because they had too few disadvantages stacked against 
them.221  This reasoning is demonstrative of a strongly result-based suspect 
classification analysis.222 
The other component of the court‘s analysis was its strong focus on the 
fit between the means of the statute, excluding same-sex couples, and the 
ends, preserving a procreative environment.223  In doing so, the court‘s 
equal protection analysis relied substantially on a process-based theoretical 
understanding of discrimination.224  More specifically, the emphasis on the 
classification‘s over- and under-inclusivity can and should be read as a 
tactic designed to shift the focus away from the external problems 
associated with sexual orientation discrimination—for example, that it 
could be demeaning225—and instead reaffirm the narrowness of the 
statutory purpose—the promotion of a procreative environment.226  In 
focusing on the ―fit‖ between the narrow statutory purpose and the 
classificatory means, the court relied on the assumption that all 
classifications, even morally problematic ones, can be used to further some 
rational purpose.227  This assumption is a process-based one.  In fact, it is 
 
 220. Conaway, 401 Md. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611–12; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
GAYLAW 143 (1999) (discussing how the shifting legal discourse on same-sex intimacy has also 
been advantageous for gay people). 
 221. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 286, 932 A.2d at 611–12.   
 222. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2443–44 (using a similar rationale to explain why 
homosexuals, Asian Americans, and Jews are not a lower caste, though they may qualify for 
suspect classification in various jurisdictions or by statute). 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 163–166; see also Conaway, 401 Md. at 322, 932 
A.2d at 633 (concluding that ―mathematical exactitude‖ is not needed in assessing the ―fit‖ 
between the statutory purpose and the classificatory means). 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 163–166. 
 225. See Posting of Deborah Hellman to PrawfsBlawg, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/05/deborah-hellman-on-prop-8-decision-peter-
westen-equality.html (May 27, 2009, 2:07 PM) (arguing that marriage discrimination against 
homosexuals ―brands their relationships as inferior‖). 
 226. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 317, 932 A.2d at 630 (explaining that because procreation is a 
fundamental right, the interest in ―fostering a stable environment for procreation‖ is a sufficiently 
―legitimate‖ governmental interest); see also HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 115 (arguing that the 
focus on classificatory accuracy is a bad model for assessing validity of discrimination because 
―many morally problematic classifications are fairly accurate‖); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 
29, at 351 (discussing how a legislator may try to avoid the problem of under-inclusivity by 
narrowly framing the purpose of the law and tying the reasonability of the classification to that 
narrow purpose). 
 227. Professors Tussman and tenBroek found the assertion that some traits ―never in fact bear a 
reasonable relation to any legitimate public purpose‖ a very difficult assertion to defend. Tussman 
& tenBroek, supra note 29, at 355.  They sidestepped the argument by noting that using such traits 
would likely never pass the reasonable relation test, an assertion ultimately disproved by the court 
in Conaway.  Id. at 356; see also Conaway, 401 Md. at 322, 932 A.2d at 633 (concluding that it is 
reasonable to bestow marriage only to opposite-sex couples because there is generally at least the 
―possibility of procreation‖). 
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the foundation for the entire model of process-based theory, which is 
predicated on the idea that all traits are fair game and simply have to be 
used in the right way.228  Here, the court needed to boost the credibility of 
its finding on the tenuous ―procreative interest,‖229 so it strongly relied on a 
process-based theory of discrimination to give it that credibility.230 
The court‘s misapplication of the appellees‘ arguments relating to the 
―dignitary harm‖ of marriage discrimination suggests that the court was 
uninterested—or perhaps just unclear—in exploring the expressive 
character of the discrimination.231  The court interpreted the appellees‘ 
arguments that a system of civil unions would still ―perpetuate dignitary 
harm,‖ ―second-class citizenship,‖ and send a ―stigmatizing message‖ as 
statements disavowing civil unions entirely.232  One reading of the court‘s 
unusual treatment of these arguments is that the court did not see these 
statements as arguments about the objectively demeaning nature of the act, 
but rather read them as the subjective beliefs of the same-sex couples and 
their lawyers.233  By treating those arguments as subjective interpretations 
of the law, the court cut off its ability to engage in an empathic reading of 
the same-sex couples‘ arguments.234  Professor Hellman suggests that a 
theory that allows people to make objective arguments about the expressive 
nature of a particular act opens up the lines of understanding between 
parties.235  Although this point is complicated and rooted in epistemic 
 
 228. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 355. 
 229. See Benjamin G. Ledsham, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage Through the 
Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2388 (2007) (―A state 
interest in procreation can provide no basis for denying marriage rights to same-sex couples, 
because that interest simultaneously proves too much and too little:  marriage is no longer linked 
directly to procreation, and same-sex couples do procreate.‖). 
 230. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 351 (arguing that courts can try to avoid the 
―charge of under-inclusiveness‖ by simply narrowing the purpose of the law, though it is a largely 
unpersuasive strategy). 
 231. See Conaway, 401 Md. at 324 n.71, 932 A.2d at 634 n.71 (interpreting the same-sex 
couples‘ arguments about how civil unions are inadequate because they ―perpetuate [a] dignitary 
harm‖ to mean that the couples did not want civil unions in the event that they failed to get full 
marriage). 
 232. Id. 
 233. The subjective reading seems apparent from the way the court presented the arguments—
as testimonials—and from the way the appellees made their arguments, discussing the effect of 
marriage discrimination on their own personal lives.  See id. (arguing that granting a remedy for 
civil unions instead of marriage would go against the statements made by plaintiffs); see also 
HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 81 (stating that the test for determining whether an act is demeaning 
is not grounded in subjectivity or stigma but in an objective assessment). 
 234. See infra notes 235–237 and accompanying text; see also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect 
Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 
1764–65 (1996) (defining ―empathy failure‖ in the context of process-based equal protection 
theory as ―the [oppressed] group‘s inability to make its claims sympathetic to potential bargaining 
partners‖ or judges). 
 235. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 81. 
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concerns, the essential argument is that casting an argument objectively 
removes the unease associated with passing judgment on personal 
considerations, and thus encourages people to engage one another and not 
shy away, as they presumably would, from conflicting subjective 
interpretations of a particular act.236  Thus, there is some support for the 
reading that the court may have disengaged from the debate about 
―dignitary harm‖ because it was reluctant to engage the same-sex couples 
about their subjective beliefs on the expressive character of the 
restriction.237  The result is one possible explanation for why the court 
chose to ignore an expressive account of the restriction of same-sex couples 
from marriage. 
C.  Iowa 
The Iowa Supreme Court subscribed to a process-based understanding 
of discrimination.  First, the court acknowledged that the function of the 
suspect classification analysis was to smoke out illegitimate motivations, 
such as ―prejudice and antipathy,‖ in the formulation of policy.238  This 
focus on legislative motivation is a trope of process-based theorists like 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek.239  Second, the court‘s use of under- and 
over-inclusivity to dismantle many of the discriminatory law‘s justifications 
was also representative of a means-ends ―fit‖ analysis, another trope of a 
process-based understanding of discrimination.240 
The court‘s use of the suspect classification analysis was designed to 
smoke out potential illegitimate legislative motivations.241  The court‘s 
focus on the factors of ―history of intentional discrimination‖ and the 
 
 236. See id. at 80 (discussing how subjective beliefs in the context of affirmative action 
generate disagreement, but discussions about how the practice of affirmative action could 
objectively demean someone would undermine the subjective beliefs about fairness and personal 
merit).  But see Godsil, supra note 44, at 251 (arguing that an objective standard will lead judges 
to determine expressive character from their own predominantly Caucasian, upper-middle class, 
male point of view, undermining the purpose of the theory). 
 237. Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (arguing that excluding African-
Americans from juries is impermissible in part because excluding Caucasians from juries would 
clearly yield a constitutionally suspect result and further noting that excluding African-Americans 
from juries is ―practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority,‖ 
and an obstacle to justice). 
 238. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 886–87 (Iowa 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985)). 
 239. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 361 (noting that the doctrine is ―in essence a 
demand for purity‖ of motive); see also Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2441 (noting that suspect 
classification generally is about gauging the likelihood that legislation will be based on 
illegitimate motives). 
 240. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 904; see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 29, at 357 (arguing 
that discrimination cannot be an end in itself). 
 241. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 899 (noting that intermediate scrutiny is required ―[i]n order 
to ensure this classification based on sexual orientation is not borne of prejudice and stereotype‖). 
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―relationship of classifying characteristic to a person‘s ability to contribute‖ 
suggests that the court‘s goal was to prevent stereotypes or generalizations 
from leaking into policy formation.242  The fact that the court emphasized 
these two factors and not political powerlessness or immutability suggests 
that the court was more focused on the motivations driving the legislation 
than on how the discrimination would impact homosexuals as a group or 
caste relative to other groups.243  Professor Sunstein‘s indicia for 
determining caste status includes political representation in part because it 
is accurate in determining current caste status; thus, he is unconcerned with 
historical caste status.244  A group can have a history of discrimination and 
not currently be a caste.245  The difference, then, is focus.  If the focus is on 
whether discrimination strengthens currently existing disparities, as it was 
in Conaway or Strauss, then the court will probably look to political 
powerlessness and immutability (immutability because it helps to clearly 
delineate one group from another).246  But if the focus is on whether 
discrimination is a manifestation of long-existing stereotypes, then the court 
will focus on the ―history‖ and ―ability to contribute‖ prongs (―ability to 
contribute‖ because it helps disprove the accuracy of a generalization and 
bolsters the intentional discrimination claim).247  Thus, the Iowa Supreme 
Court‘s framing of the suspect classification analysis strongly suggests that 
it relied more on a process-based theory of discrimination than on a result-
based or expressive-based theory. 
 
 242. Id. at 889; see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 473 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
history is the best guide to determining if a society is likely to stigmatize individuals); id. at 441 
(majority opinion) (noting that ―relation to ability to perform‖ is a factor that explains why sex 
discrimination usually rests on ―outmoded notions‖ of women and men‘s abilities). 
 243. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (―The political 
powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining trait are relevant insofar as they 
point to a social and cultural isolation that gives the majority little reason to respect or be 
concerned with that group‘s interests and needs.‖) 
 244. See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2448 (discussing data about political representation of 
African-Americans); see also id. at 2443 (noting that the ―history of discrimination‖ factor in the 
suspect classification analysis is designed to target motive, which is distinct from the anticaste 
principle‘s focus on the creation of disparities). 
 245. Id. at 2444 (discussing Jews and homosexuals as examples). 
 246. See id. at 2442 (discussing how the political powerlessness analysis contains an 
unarticulated claim about how much political power a particular group should have); see also id. 
at 2429 (discussing how ―highly visible and irrelevant‖ differences should not, from a moral 
perspective, be the source of any systemic disadvantage—an argument parallel to the immutability 
analysis); Rachel Shapiro, Note, Conaway v. Deane: To Have and to Hold, From This Day 
Forward—Maryland’s Unfit Marriage to Federal Equal Protection Analysis, 68 MD. L. REV. 957, 
982–83 (2009) (arguing that political powerlessness and immutability were improperly 
emphasized in the suspect classification analysis in Conaway). 
 247. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 473 n.24 (arguing that history is the best guide to determining if 
a society is likely to stigmatize individuals); id. at 441 (majority opinion) (noting that ―relation to 
ability to perform‖ is a factor that explains why sex discrimination usually rests on ―outmoded 
notions‖ of women and men‘s abilities). 
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The court‘s strong emphasis on the ―fit‖ between the classification and 
the purposes of the law suggests that it embraced a process-based 
understanding of discrimination.248  For example, the court concluded that 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage was under-inclusive in 
promoting an ―optimal environment to raise children‖ because other groups 
of potential parents who would not provide optimal environments, like 
sexual predators or child abusers, were not also excluded from the 
institution of civil marriage.249  The court also reasoned that the ban was 
over-inclusive because not all same-sex couples choose to have children.250  
The court‘s framework for analyzing inclusivity or ―fit‖ is process-based 
because it meshes naturally with the court‘s emphasis on history in the 
suspect classification analysis,251 and classificatory accuracy is a logical 
focus if there is a history of irrational discrimination.252  For example, a law 
forbidding gay men from teaching children may be based on long-standing 
societal views that sexual conduct of gay men is unnatural and perverse 
because it allows men to assume the sexual role of a woman, and thus such 
men should simply not be around children in their formative years.253  A 
strong focus on the fit between the means, targeting homosexuals, and the 
end, protecting children from sexual perversion, would best expose and 
defeat this illegitimate generalization by undermining the rationale for it.254  
If, in fact, gay men are not more likely to promote sexual perversion in 
children than any other class of people, then this classification makes little 
sense.255 
In the context of same-sex marriage, this analysis is evidence that the 
court‘s emphasis on ―fit‖ was (1) a manifestation of process-based theory 
because the purpose of the ―fit‖ analysis was to smoke out illegitimate 
motivations, and (2) a complement to the court‘s focus on the history of 
intentional discrimination against homosexuals, which also focused on 
revealing illegitimate motivations.   
 
 248. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 899–900 (Iowa 2009); see also Tussman & 
tenBroek, supra note 29, at 346 (arguing that a reasonable classification is one that accurately 
targets a particular class in order to achieve a statutory purpose). 
 249. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 900. 
 250. Id. at 900–01. 
 251. Id. at 889–90. 
 252. HELLMAN, supra note 22, at 133. 
 253. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 44, at 159 (noting that people who engage in same-sex 
sexual activity are stigmatized because they have failed to live up to the expectations of their 
gender).   
 254. See SCHAUER, supra note 25, at 133 (discussing how irrational generalizations can be 
exposed through an empirical focus on the relation between the proxy trait and the purpose of the 
practice). 
 255. See id. (noting that a poor fit between a proxy trait and the purpose of a classification 
indicates an irrational and invalid classification). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Although this analysis is not comprehensive, the results indicate a 
trend.  If a court subscribes to a result-based conception of discrimination, 
then it is likely to find exclusionary marriage laws constitutional under the 
same principles.256  Alternatively, if a court subscribes to a process-based 
conception of discrimination, then it is likely to find exclusionary marriage 
laws unconstitutional under equal protection principles.257  None of the 
courts discussed in this Comment used an expressive-based theory of 
discrimination, although Justice Moreno‘s dissent in Strauss v. Horton, 
probably the closest example to an expressive-based understanding of 
antidiscrimination, suggests that expressivists would likely invalidate such 
laws.258  
In the gay marriage culture war, gay marriage activists would be well 
served to note this trend and calibrate their legal arguments accordingly.  
By conceptualizing discrimination as a check against a flawed 
policymaking process, gay marriage activists may be able to succeed in 
persuading future state courts—or perhaps federal courts—of the 
destructive nature of discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 
 
 256. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
 257. See supra Part IV.C. 
 258. See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.  But see Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 735 (2001) (noting that some 
practices, like flying a Confederate flag, have very ambiguous social meanings that can pose 
problems for expressivism in the equal protection context). 
